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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal decentralisation refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility from 
central government to sub-national or the local government. It is mostly pre-assumed that 
fiscal decentralisation can play important role in the efficient allocations of resources and 
improvement of the political, economic and social activities. Many studies unlock the 
relationship between federal government and sub-national governments or local 
government. Fiscal decentralisation theories mostly based on Richard Musgrave’s (1939) 
functions of government. He defined three roles: stabilisation, allocation and distribution 
whereas, only the allocation function seems to be appropriate to fiscal decentralisation 
theory. Because these three functions are not equally suitable for all level of governments 
and it is necessary for efficiency that each function is properly matched to the level. It is a 
step forward towards more responsive and efficient governance if the decentralisation is 
done properly [Oates (1972)]. The logic behind fiscal decentralisation is accountability 
and efficiency; the smaller organisations are more fragile for accountability than the 
larger ones. However, decentralisation has not always been effective in the provision of 
service delivery and hardly accountable due to lack of community participation. If there 
is no spill over effects and in the absence of diseconomies of scale it could be effective 
and efficient. The sub-national governments where the externalities are internalised and 
scale economies are acceptable fiscal responsibilities should be assigned [Rodden, et al. 
(2003)]. The sub-national governments are much closer to the people and they are better 
informed to respond according to their demands of goods and services [Hayek (1945); 
Qian and Weingast (1997)].  Service deliveries are highly dependent on transfers from 
central governments. It is necessary to increase the revenue autonomy of sub-national 
governments and it is linked with the service delivery in social sector [Elhiraika (2007)]. 
Lower level of governments is closer to the people and much aware of the preferences of 
localities. Service deliveries should be located at the lowest level because decentralised 
provision of services increases the economic welfare [Oates (1999)]. 
This study examines the fiscal decentralisation trend in Pakistan. The 1973s 
constitution provides a clear distinction between the central and the provincial 
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government’s taxation powers and sharing of revenues. The constitution and the 
amendments support more the decentralised system than unitary one. First attempt was 
made by Bhutto in 1974 and the National Finance Commission was formed in which the 
shares between central and sub-national governments were 80:20 respectively. Through 
the developmental process now the shares of Central and sub-national governments are 
set at 56:44 respectively (7th NFC Award). This increase of the share enables the sub-
national governments to enhance the service delivery and efficiently allocate the 
resources in the most demanding areas. It is commonly argued that decentralisation 
improves the efficiency of resource allocation [Oates (1999)]. But in reverse during the 
last five years the health expenditure shrank at provincial level. Although sub-national 
governments share increases from 20 percent to 37.5 percent (Table.1) in 1996 NFC 
Award but health and education expenditure of all the sub-national governments 
squeezed in average after this. (Table 2). Whether this increase in shares of sub-national 
governments in the 7th NFC Award will increase the Expenditure of Social Sector? 
The main focus of the paper is to analyse the efficiency of provinces in the 
provision of health and educational services and their impact on human development.  
Matheson and Afar (1999) proves positive impact of decentralisation on health and 
education outcomes. In Model I variables are taken as a consolidated decentralisation of 
revenues, expenditure and urban living. The results of the model I suggest the positive 
impact of decentralisation indicator on Human Development Index. In the IInd Model, 
expenditure on health and education as a percent of total expenditure of province are 
taken as dependent and proxy for human development. The analysis shows that the 
provinces are not yet independent in their revenue and expenditure composition due to 
dependency of federal transfers. Provinces are far away from fiscal autonomy having less 
political decentralisation.   
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fiscal decentralisation is considered one of the essential tools to improve the 
economic growth, efficient public service delivery and better infrastructure in the case of 
developing countries. There are many studies about the fiscal decentralisation. The social 
sector service delivery is efficiently addressed by the decentralisation and is evidenced by 
the different studies that they have positive and significant relation in many cases. It is 
commonly argued that the devolution of powers and functions may remove the obstacles 
to government decision-making and implementation process [Meager (1999)]. 
Kiran (2005) studied the gains of decentralisation at state-level in India and builds 
a panel data model for 16 Indian states from 1980-2001. The results show that the 
decentralisation has the positive effect on the standard of living of residents of the state. 
Further he includes many social variables like spending on the education and health to 
find out the impact of decentralisation on the social sector and  the benefits vary from 
state to state but fiscal decentralisation have overall positive effect on the economic 
growth at the expense of regional disparity. As the less benefit is exercised by the poor 
states and higher benefit by rich states, this widens the income inequalities among the 
states. Halder (2007) measures the fiscal decentralisation by three different measures: 
expenditure ratio, revenue ratio and composite ratio while the last ratio has more 
explanatory power than the previous two. All the measures of decentralisation have the 
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same results that the fiscal decentralisation has positive correlation with HDI, life 
expectancy, and GDP while negative correlation with infant mortality rate. Elhiraika 
(2007) studies the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the public service delivery basic 
focus is on the sub-national governments’ autonomy measure by own-source revenue in 
South Africa. He finds that the provincial own-source revenue is negatively related to the 
health expenditure as the health service is assumed to be the responsibility of central 
government but positive relationship with per-capita income that means if the population 
gets richer the provincial government will allocate more resources to health but the result 
is contradictory. Education demand is also found insignificant to the changes in 
intergovernmental grants. It is also found out that the richer provinces get more revenue. 
Fjeldstad (2001) finds out whether fiscal decentralisation is better or worse in the 
prevailing economic condition of Tanzania and further discusses the role in public sector 
delivery. He suggests that the high corruption, poorly defined taxes, distortion in public 
service could further aggravate the distortion if decentralisation is increased further 
without judging the capacity of local bodies. So there is a need of restructuring, capacity 
building and improving the integrity of the system otherwise decentralisation will result 
in mismanagement and high corruption. Atsushi Limi (2004) finds out the empirical 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in Pakistan using 
instrument variables cross-country from 1997 to 2001. He measures decentralisation by 
the local share of expenditure to the total expenditure. The results show that fiscal 
decentralisation has positive impact on the per-capita of a country and further it improves 
the public service provision. Atsushi emphasises that the fiscal decentralisation on 
expenditure side is more effective for economic growth. 
Peterson (2002) presents a draft for World Bank about the fiscal decentralisation 
of Pakistan and highlights the political, governance, and service delivery issues. He 
discusses that the uncertain authority that is allocated to the provinces and local 
government raise many conflicts, there should be the need of the direct grants to private 
organisation to encourage the citizen’s participation. Citizen Community Boards are the 
non-profit bodies which should be developed in a way to increase and improve the 
service delivery; and to enhance the accountability and better resource mobilisation. As 
the District governments have the important human service delivery functions: education 
and health care, but the efficiency of the service delivery is the outcome of many factors: 
skill of employees, adequate government resources, willingness of public institutions and 
employees. He further mentions some important flaws in the fiscal decentralisation like 
low level of own-source revenues, failure of the quality service delivery, higher 
dependence on grant by the provinces than the urban population, predetermined taxes and 
tax rates. Hafiz and Aisha (2001) presented a paper on fiscal decentralisation and the 
devolution of power at Social Policy and Development Centre. He discusses the major 
issues of fiscal decentralisation that arises from National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) 
devolution plan. He proposes that as the federal government has the surplus revenues 
while the provincial and local governments are in deficit so there is a need for large 
transfers from federal to provincial governments but it is important whether the transfer 
criteria should depend on the population, measure of backwardness, service delivery and 
many other factors. Taxes assignment should be clear cut to avoid the overlapping of tax 
bases, immobile taxes should be levied by local bodies otherwise there will arise a 
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problem of tax competition. Tax exporting should be reduced as it creates regional 
disparities. And revenue assignment should be simple and include other criteria than 
population like service transfer, revenue collection, and backwardness. While grants 
should be for general purpose so that the local governments may have the autonomy to 
spend according to their needs and preferences.  
Levaggi and Smith (2003) find the implication of decentralisation on the efficiency 
and equity of health sector in UK, Spain and Italy. He concludes that there are three 
important issues to deal with, when decentralisation in health care is done: utilising of 
information advantages, need of diversity amongst local laws, spill over effect between 
laws.  Minassain (1997) finds out that how the fiscal decentralisation constraints central 
government ability to carry out their predetermined macroeconomic management and this 
cost could be minimised. He concludes that hard budget constraint and much involvement 
of sub-national governments in macroeconomic management could reduce this cost. Habib, 
et al. (2003) used the panel data set and found positive impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
health and education among the provinces of Argentina. He observes that the disparity in 
educational output and infant mortality rate between high and low income provinces 
decreases significantly from 1970 to 1994 due to rise in per-capita health and education 
expenditure in low income provinces. Abay, et al. (2001) tests empirically the impact of 
fiscal decentralisation on rural mortality rate in India from 1990 to 1997. He argued that 
fiscal decentralisation could be more effective If it is done alongside political 
decentralisation. The results of random effect model show the statistically significant 
negative relation between fiscal decentralisation and infant mortality rate. 
Skira (2006) studies the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and poverty 
for 200 countries from 1965-2000 and 2004. He has derived some ratios for 
decentralisation like expenditure decentralisation, education decentralisation and health 
decentralisation and also included the LIS (Luxemburg Income Study) poverty data, 
which is percent of persons living in families below 50 percent of the median family 
income. He separately measures the decentralisation impact of these ratios. The result of 
simple to moderate levels of fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction measured by 
HDI shows negative result while on high level of decentralisation findings are contrary to 
it, positive association between decentralisation and poverty reduction outcomes. While 
poverty measured by LIS shows that fiscal decentralisation does not reduce poverty. 
Results of Poverty measured by health and education decentralisation show that there 
exists negative correlation between drop out ratios and fiscal decentralisation meaning 
that it has a positive effect on poverty reduction. Beox, et al. (2006) studies the linkages 
between poverty and fiscal decentralisation, showing how the poverty reduction is 
possible by expenditure assignment, revenue assignment and intergovernmental transfer. 
He finds out that when the expenditure assignments are clear and stable, the devolution 
will be more pro-poor. He emphasises that local government should have power to levy 
fees and local taxes that will improve their potential and service delivery at all levels. 
Decentralisation in health and education will lead to the involvement of citizens in 
decision-making and make local service provisions more accountable. 
Rao (2003) has done a comparative study in the pre and post reform era in case of 
China and India and further identified the emerging challenges for the transition 
countries. He concludes that it is necessary to develop an efficient expenditure, tax and 
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intergovernmental system and capacity-building of institutions at centre and local level. 
Anwar (2004) has studied the fiscal decentralisation problems and progress in 33 
developing and transition countries 1980-1999. Among them in 12 countries the primary 
education was the sole function of local bodies while in 9 additional countries it was 
shared between centre and local bodies and Pakistan is among one of them. He finds that 
the transition countries’ sub-national governments expenditure as percentage of GDP, 
total expenditure, educational and health expenditure represents a declining trend while in 
case of developing countries the expenditure on education and health spending is 
increasing over time. Shah (2003) presented a report at UNESCO seminar about the 
decentralisation in educational system in Pakistan. He has highlighted certain issues like 
citizen have no access in the decision making and limited access to social service, central 
government does not respond to the local bodies need. Highly centralised education 
system is the main reason of distortion and lack of efficiency and effectiveness of service 
delivery at grass root level.    
 
3.  OBJECTIVES OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN PAKISTAN 
Objective of fiscal decentralisation in Pakistan is the same as in other developing 
countries, the provision of service delivery and increase the fiscal autonomy of sub-
national governments. It creates harmony among the provinces and strengthens the 
federation. Public finance literature suggests that fiscal decentralisation increases the 
efficiency of sub-national governments in the provision of service delivery. In contrast to 
the theory of real fiscal decentralisation, due the central type of government in Pakistan, 
most of the revenues collected by central government and distributed among the 
provinces through typical revenue sharing formula (NFC). The provinces in turn 
redistribute the revenue among the lower tier of governments or spend through the 
ministries in the absence of local governments (PFC).    Table1 shows that the provincial 
share increases with the passage of time and in 7th NFC award it crossed the limit of fifty 
percent. This significantly changes the ratio of allocation of transfers to the provinces up 
to 56 percent of the total share enhancing the decentralisation process. 
Under the constitution (1973), maintaining local governments is a provincial 
subject. Constitution allows national government to empower the provinces and establish 
local governments. Unfortunately, in Pakistan local governments have been established 
by the Dictators without any protection from parent provinces and therefore fail to 
deliver. Pakistan has a confused system of fiscal decentralisation having large 
expenditure assignments almost 27 percent in 2010 to provincial governments with 
limited tax autonomy of provinces which was 13.77 percent in 2010. The expenditure 
decentralisation and tax autonomy in 1989 were 25 percent and 17 percent respectively 
(Fig. 1). This indicates limited tax decentralisation in the country. It is observed through 
calculations, the tax autonomy of the provinces is limited and they do not have decision 
power to collect the tax, set the rate and determine the base. Rodden, Gunnar, and Jennie 
(2003) suggested that the accountabilities and responsibilities of central and sub-national 
governments should be divided into well-defined, mutually exclusive categories. 
Unfortunate many efforts failed to create fiscal federalism in country.
1
   
 
1Fiscal federalism refers to a political system with a constitution and powers to both of central and 
decentralised level of governments, see Oates (1999). 
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Table 1 
Year Federal % Provincial % 
1974 80 20 
1979 80 20 
1985 Interim Award Interim Award 
1990 80 20 
1996 62.5 37.5 
2000 Interim Award Interim Award 
2010 44 56 
Source:  Economic Survey of Pakistan. 
7th Award: 44:56 for 1st year and remaining year it will be 42.5:57.5. 
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Source: FBS, Statistical Year Book. 
PEPRF = Ratio of Provincial Expenditure over total Expenditure. 
POSR = Ratio of Provincial own-source revenue over total revenue. 
Fig. 1. 
 
3.1.  Human Development Index (HDI) 
HDI is developed by UNDP in 1990 it’s a better measure for Human Development. 
HDI is a fraction and capture the over all human developments in the country. It measures 
the three basic areas of human development: the longevity, measured by life expectancy at 
birth; Knowledge, measured by adult literacy rate and gross enrolment ratio assigned 2/3 
and 1/3 weights respectively and the decent standard of living, measured by per-capita PPP 
income of the country. Sikira (2006) uses HDI as a dependent variable and regressed on 
expenditure decentralisation and other variables and found positive relation. In this paper 
we are too using HDI as a dependent variable and regressing it on expenditure as well as 
revenue decentralisation variables: provincial own-sourced revenue, ratio of provincial 
expenditure over the total government expenditure and further adding the ratio of urban 
population to the total population as the urban population contributes to push and pull 
factors which exert pressure on service delivery.
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3.2. Revenue Decentralisation  
       Own-source Revenue of Sub-national Governments 
Figure 2 shows that provincial own-source revenue as a percentage of total 
revenue of provinces starts decreases in 1987 and then in 1996 after 5the NFC award 
increases slightly. In case of those countries where sub-national governments have less 
control over tax autonomy, and sub-national governments are dependent on the transfers 
from central government, own-source revenue is better measure. In public finance 
literature it is considered as a weak measure of decentralisation which does not show the 
tax autonomy of sub-national governments.  
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Source: Fifty Years of Statistics. 
Fig. 2. 
 
3.3.  Tax Autonomy of Sub-national Governments  
         (Degree of Tax Revenue Decentralisation) 
Tax autonomy of sub-national governments shows the rights of sub-national 
governments to define the tax base, determine the rate and define the tax relieves for 
individual and firms under the jurisdiction.  The tax autonomy of sub-national 
governments is necessary for the discretion and preferences in spending. In fact 
Stegarescue (2005), this indicator captures the real decentralisation in revenues 
generation and decision power of the sub-national governments. Leviathan literature 
suggests that the decentralisation of the taxing powers increases the efficiency of the 
governments. Brennean and Buchannan (1980) examined that the taxing powers should 
have separate jurisdictions with restrictions. It increases the competition among 
jurisdictions.  Figure 3 suggests that the degree of tax autonomy of the provincial 
governments decreased significantly since 1987 then its starts increasing slightly after 
1995. 
sAssignmentTaxFederalRevenueTaxOwnSNG
RevenueTaxOwnSNG
TA

  
Where TA = Tax Autonomy, SNG = Sub-national Governments   
Provincial Own Source Revenue as % of TR 
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Consolidated Tax autonomy of Sub-national Governments
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Source: Statistical Year Book, FBS. 
Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 4 shows that the tax autonomy of Balochistan among the all provinces and 
it depends on the federal transfers more than other provinces, which accounts for 93 
percent of its total revenue. Own-source revenues are low because of a narrow revenue 
base and poor revenue administration. [ADB (2008)].  The tax autonomy of Sindh and 
Punjab gives mix results but after 2006 Sindh’s own tax revenue increases significantly 
than other. It is importantly argue that the increase in this ratio shows the independency 
of provinces than federal transfers and indicate the potential of revenue generation.  
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3.3.1.  Impact of Tax Autonomy of Sub-national Governments  
           on Education and Health 
In common practice decentralisation is considered effective in the public sector 
management and improving the overall health facilities. World Bank reports suggest that; 
delineate responsibilities among stakeholders and formally codified responsibilities in 
legislation, regulation or in other instruments. In general, the impact of decentralisation 
on service delivery is not efficient. Rational Choice theory suggests that individual thinks 
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how to achieve the concrete goal that embodies his values to allocate his scarce resources 
in terms of means and ends [Beer (1976)]. Fiscal autonomy empowers the sub-national 
governments to allocate resources according to needs and preferences of residents.  While 
in centralisation the allocation of resources might be inefficient due to heterogeneity of 
choices among the regions. Modern economic theory also assumes that the individual 
allocates their resources in the way where its utility maximises. If along with the tax 
autonomy the sub-national governments maximise the utility of their residents in the 
provision of social services, the revenue of sub-national governments will be enhanced.  
 
3.4.  Expenditure Decentralisation 
Figure 5 shows the little increase in provincial expenditure as percent of federal 
government expenditure. In 1979 sub-national governments’ expenditure was 25 percent 
reaches maximum of 31 percent in 2005-06 and after ups and downs it’s nearly 27 
percent in 2009. As the sub-national government expenditure shows upward trend from 
2009 due to the formation of local government and the huge transfers of fund to the local 
bodies through provinces.  
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Source: Statistical Year Book, FBS.  
Fig. 5. 
 
3.5.  Urban Population  
The considerable growth in urban population impacts the human development in 
Pakistan. According to 1981census population in urban areas was 28.3 percent and in 
1998 it increases up to 32.5 percent. Urbanisation attributed to push and pull factors. The 
significant growth (4.8 percent) in urban population in 80s is mostly due to rural 
immigration. The pull factors in urbanisation are availability of jobs in industry and 
services, better education and health facilities [Zaidi (2005)]. The pull factors of 
urbanisation also exert a pressure on service delivery in social sectors. Service delivery in 
social sector increases the revenues and expenditure composition and enhances the 
human development. While the push factors like unemployment, price and availability of 
land has adverse effect on the human development.  
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3.6.  Service Delivery Health and Education and Their Outcomes 
Provincial Health and Education Expenditure as percent of Total Expenditure. 
 
Table 2 
 1989-1996 1997-2009 
 Health Education Health Education 
Punjab 5.80 25.49 4.8 14.20 
Sindh 6.14 22.50 4.76 13.47 
KPK 6.30 23.32 5.69 20.59 
Balochistan 6.83 17.44 4.88 11.80 
Source: Statistical Year Book (Various Issues). 
 
Provincial Expenditure on Education FBS and Health 
    ( percent of Federal Expenditure) 
After 18th amendment the health and education sectors are the solely provincial 
domain. The provincial governments can improve the social services delivery and set the 
expenditure composition [Tiebout (1956)]. This process can enhance the resources and 
social capital. The Figure 6 shows that the sub-national governments are more 
decentralised in health and education expenditure. This variable measures the expenditure 
autonomy of sub-national governments over the expenditure of health and education, and 
affects the service delivery [Skira (2006)].  
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Source: Statistical Year Book (FBS). 
Fig. 6. 
 
Autonomy in service delivery sets the preferences of sub-national governments to 
improve the human development in the region. Figure 6 shows the trend in sub-national 
governments’ expenditure preferences in the provision of health and service delivery 
across the provinces, this measure suggests in Government Finance Statistics (GFS) as 
health and educational decentralisation. World Bank (2006) studies consider that, in 
common practice decentralisation could be effective in the public management and 
improves overall health facilities. Studies suggest that responsibilities are formally 
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codified in legislation, regulation other budget binding instruments that are the hurdles in 
the way of provision of service delivery. Khaleghian (2004) also finds mix results for 
different service provision in different countries. Fiscal decentralisation is fruitful along 
with political decentralisation. Before the devolution plan education expenditure was 
stagnant during 1995 to 2001 and it starts increasing significantly after 2003 almost 31 
percent at all levels of governments. Before the devolution plan annual growth in literacy 
rate was 0.3 percent, which significantly increases after devolution up to 1.4 percent. The 
other indicator of social development is health. There is no significant change in the rate 
of improvement in key health outcomes like life expectancy and mortality. During the 
period the share of allocation to general hospitals and clinics by three provinces 
excluding Sindh declined. [SPDC Annual Review (2006-07)]. 
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Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, various issues. 
Fig. 7. 
 
Figure 7 Show that health and education expenditure as percent of GDP is very 
low. Pakistan among the SAARC countries has lowest rank in case of expenditures on 
afore-mentioned sector.  Education expenditure was 2.6 percent of GDP and health 
expenditure was 1.4 percent of GDP (1997) were ever highest in the history of country. 
The squeeze in social sector expenditure is one of the major causes of slow economic and 
social development [PHCR (2003)]. During nineties Pakistan falls in low development 
countries list. After 2003 the HDI improves slightly and again come in medium 
development. 
  
4.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
HDI = F (POSR, PEPFE, PUP) … … … … … (1) 
Where  
 HDI = Human Development Index, POSR = Consolidated provincial own-
source Revenue.  
 PEPFE = Ratio of Provincial Expenditure over Total Government Expenditure, 
PUP = Ratio of Urban population to the total population. 
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4.1.  Methodology 
As the time series has usually the unit root problem so we apply the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test to make it stationary. We further examine Long run 
relationship among variable so we will use Johnson co-integrating test. After applying 
unit root test to each variable the results show that all the variables are stationary at first 
difference so we apply Johnson co-integrating test to find out the Long run relationship 
between the variables. (Table 3). The null hypothesis of the ADF is that series has unit 
root. 
Yt = o + t + 1Yt–1 +  Yt–1  … … … … …  (2)  
 
Long run Co-integration Test 
For long run relationship we have applied the likelihood ratio test that is based on 
the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics of the stochastic matrix of the Johansen 
(1988) procedure. As our ADF test results show that all variables are co-integrated at the 
same level so JJ co-integration test is appropriate to find the long run relationship among 
the variables. 
 
4.2. Data and Empirical Evidence 
 
4.2.1.  Model I 
The model has been estimated using annual data from 1976- 2009. Data has been 
collected from fifty years of statistic and other various Annual reports of SBP, World 
Development Indicator and Human Development report by UNDP and SPDC reports. 
 
Table 3 
Test for Unit- Root: (ADF with Drift and Trend) 
Variables Level First Difference 
HDI –0.876788 –5.001944* 
PEPFE –2.08233 –6.082967* 
POSR –1.644923 –4.07786* 
PUP 1.575772 –10.42968* 
Note: Schwarz information criterion is used to select the optimum lag length. 
(* ) Significant at 1 percent Level (**) significant at 5 percent level (**) significant at 10 percent level. 
All the entire three variables are Non Stationary at level but found Stationary at 1st Difference. 
 
Once the series may be integrated at first difference by using ADF, it is 
appropriated that by applying Johnson Co-integration technique can check long run 
relation. The results in Table 4 suggested that there exists long run relation among the 
variables. Both Maximum Eigen value and Trace statistics shows two co-integration 
equation at 5 percent level of significance. Table 5 shows that decentralisation indicator 
of revenue, expenditure and ration of urban population are significant and having positive 
sign. As urban population increase, the income per-capita and the demand for health and 
education increase. With the more decentralisation and increase in urban population 
impacts significantly and positively human development across the country. 
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Table 4 
Johnson Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test 
Hypothesised 
No. of CE(s) Hypothesis 
Trace Max Eigen Statistic 
Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
None * Ho; r=0,     
 H1; r>1 74.48846 47.85613 34.14526 27.58434 
At Most 1 * Ho; r=1,     
 H1; r>2 40.34320 29.79707 29.56517 21.13162 
At Most 2 * Ho; r=2,     
 H1; r>3 10.77804 15.49471 8.048749 14.26460 
At Most 3 * Ho; r=3,     
 H1; r>4 2.729288 3.841466 2.729288 3.84146 
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
Trace test indicates 2 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. 
 
The derived Equation (3) states the long run relationship among HDI, 
Decentralisation and urban population.   
HDIt = 0.00412PEPFEt  + 9.96 POSR t + 0 .0239 PUP t ... ... (3) 
 
Table 5 
Normalised Cointegrating Coefficients 
Dependent Variable: HDI 
PEPFE 0.00412 
POSR 9.9650 
PUP 0.023968 
 
4.2.2.  Model II (Panel Data) 
The model has been estimated using four cross-sectional data for four provinces 
for the period of 1989-2009. Equations (5) and (6) are health and education. In both 
equation dependent variables are health and education expenditure as percent of total 
provincial expenditure. Independent variables are provincial revenue and decentralisation 
indicators as used in GFS. Panel data is used to pool the cross-sectional units at time. 
This data have both the cross-section as well as time series dimension. There are two 
main regressions of panel data: fixed effects regression and random effect regression. The 
estimated model is simple linear model: 
Yit =  + Xit + µit   … … … … … … (4) 
For i  = 1,2 ….N , and t = 1, 2, ……,T 
HE = F (POSR, PEFE) … … … … … … (5) 
EDE = F (POSR, PEFE) … … … … … … (6) 
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Table 6 
 Education Health 
 Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
Constant 12.4752* 7.340572 5.9375* 14.36838 
POSR 0.1140* 3.429157 0.0175 0.993251 
PEFE 0.1829 1.373243 –0.0898** –1.949059 
R
2
 0.72  0.32  
Fixed Effects; (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
The results (Table 6) of panel data estimation for provinces shows that 
provincial own source revenue have positive and significant impact on educational 
expenditure across the provinces. But we get opposite results in case of health 
expenditure as share of total provincial expenditure own-source revenue has 
insignificant relation while the provincial expenditure as the share of total 
expenditure shows negative and significant result. These results indicate the  squeeze 
in health expenditures across the provinces. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The main focus of this paper is to provide empirical evaluation, theory and 
evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and human development 
for Pakistan. Fiscal decentralisation is the basic tool for the efficient provision of 
service delivery. The effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation can increase the human 
development and also strengthens the federation. As our study have suggested that 
the fiscal decentralisation at the expenditure and revenue side has positively 
attributed to the HDI and results further suggested that the urbanisation variable has 
positively and significantly impact on HDI because of the pull effects outweigh the 
push factors. As Table 2, shows that there is high distortion in education and health 
expenditure especially last two years in all the provinces so there is a need of 
efficient allocation and prioritising of expenditure. As far as the tax autonomy and 
own-source revenue is concerned we have seen gradual distortion continuously and 
show little bit recovery in last two years and distortion respectively (Figures 2 and 
3). Especially tax autonomy of Balochistan is lowest in all provinces. As fiscal 
decentralisation variables are positively related to the human development so there is 
a need to increase the fiscal autonomy of the sub-national governments and it should 
be linked with the service delivery in social sector. Fiscal decentralisation on 
expenditure side is more effective for economic growth as the local bodies have the 
autonomy to mobilise their resources in the most efficient way. Fiscal autonomy 
empowers the sub-national governments to allocate resources according to needs and 
preferences of residents. There should be direct grants from federal government to 
encourage the citizens’ participation which could be effective if done along with 
political decentralisation in Pakistan.  
Local governments should have the power to levy fees and local taxes which 
will improve their provision of service delivery and increase the fiscal autonomy of 
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sub-national tiers of government. Decentralisation in health and education will lead 
to the involvement of citizens in decision-making and make local service provider 
more accountable. But there is a need of sub-national government to take part in the 
education and health service delivery at provincial level as it will increase the 
efficiency and service delivery at grass root level and improve the human 
development. 
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